State Taxation of Multinational Corporations and the Apportionment of Worldwide Income: \u3ci\u3eContainer Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board\u3c/i\u3e, 103 S.Ct. 2933 (1983) by Vitek, John C.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 63 | Issue 3 Article 7
1984
State Taxation of Multinational Corporations and
the Apportionment of Worldwide Income:
Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax
Board, 103 S.Ct. 2933 (1983)
John C. Vitek
University of Nebraska College of Law, jvitek@mzmilw.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
John C. Vitek, State Taxation of Multinational Corporations and the Apportionment of Worldwide Income: Container Corporation of
America v. Franchise Tax Board, 103 S.Ct. 2933 (1983), 63 Neb. L. Rev. (1984)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol63/iss3/7
Note
State Taxation of Multinational
Corporations and the
Apportionment of Worldwide
Income
Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax
Board, 103 S.Ct. 2933 (1983).
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction ................................................ 631
H1. Unitary-Business and Income Distortion ................. 635
A. The Unitary-Business Determination ............... 635
B. Distortion of Income Through Apportionment ..... 640
I. Foreign Commerce Considerations ...................... 646
A. Double Taxation ..................................... 647
B. Federal Uniformity ................................... 650
IV. Conclusion ................................................ 655
I. INTRODUCTION
In the taxation of corporations, California employs an income
tax method' which utilizes the "unitary-business" doctrine2 and
three-factor formula apportionment.3 Rather than determining lo-
1. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 25101 -25140 (West 1979). This approach is modeled
after the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA)
method.
2. The various aspects involved in the definition of a unitary-business are ex-
amined more fully in Section HA of this Article. The basic concept of a uni-
tary-business relates to two or more business entities (in this case parent
and subsidiary corporations) which are closely affiliated and which through
their organizational or operational structure transfer value (through such
means as economies of scale) between the entities. The unitary-business
concept ignores the separateness of the entities in form and, instead, focuses
on practical business realities and treats the separate entities as one busi-
ness for the purpose of state income tax analysis.
3. The formula apportionment method of attributing the income of a corpora-
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cally taxable income based on traditional separate accounting
methods,4 which most states consider inherently suspect due to
the possibilities of "manipulation and imprecision," and which
often ignore or fail to adequately capture "the many subtle and
largely unquantifiable transfers of value that take place among the
components of a single enterprise,"5 California rejects the figures
derived from these more formal separate accounting methods. In-
stead, California determines the existence of a "unitary-business"
which operates across state or national boundaries. Once the
scope of the unitary-business has been defined, California appor-
tions the worldwide income of that unitary-business to the state on
the basis of a three-factor formula. This method of state corporate
income taxation has gained wide acceptance. 6
Container Corporation of America (hereinafter referred to as
Container Corporation) is a manufacturer of custom-ordered pa-
tion to the taxing state involves an analysis of certain factors which go into
the production of income, the total amount of those factors present in the
unitary-business, and the extent to which those factors are present in the
taxing state. California and UDITPA utilize three factors: property, payroll,
and sales. The basic calculations involved in the three-factor formula appor-
tionment method can be mathematically illustrated as follows:
In-State In-State Payroll In-State Salest
Property of of of
All Unitary All Unitary All Unitary
Corporations Corporations Corporations
Operating in Operating in Operating in Combined
State State State Total Net
+ + X Income Earned = Income Earned
Everywhere Everywhere Everywhere Everywhere By Within Taxing
Property of Payroll of Sales of Unitary Group State
Unitary G oup Unitary Group Unitary Group
AVERAGED BY DIVIDING THESE FACTORS BY 3
t All intercorporate transactions are eliminated in this forumula.
WhiteNack, State Tax Litigation after the Container Decision: The Potential
Tax Break for Foreign Multinationals, 21 TAx NOTES 771 (1983).
4. Corporate entities using separate accounting methods treat each entity, or
component of an entity, as separate for the purpose of attributing income to a
state or other jurisdiction. This analysis has traditionally been done on a geo-
graphical basis, attributing to the state the income realized on the books of
the entity or component located in the state and ignoring interjurisdictional
transfers of value between entities or components.
5. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2940 (1983).
For example, a study by the Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition, based on a sur-
vey of sixteen states, concluded that multinational oil companies may under-
report income by as much as 50 percent. Unitary Tax, DAILY TAx REPORT
(BNA) No. 233, at G-5 (Dec. 2, 1983).
6. Twenty-four states currently use the unitary-business/formula apportion-
ment method of income attribution. Of these, twelve states have adopted the
approach of apportioning the enterprise's worldwide income. Unitary Tax,
DAiLY TAX REPORT (BNA) No. 185, at G-6 (Sept. 22, 1983) [hereinafter cited as
Unitary Tax].
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perboard packaging whose United States operations are vertically
integrated.7 During the years at issue8 Container Corporation con-
trolled twenty foreign subsidiaries,9 owning between 66.7 percent
and 100 percent of each subsidiary.10 All but two of these subsidi-
aries were engaged in the same business as Container Corpora-
tion." Sales from Container Corporation to its subsidiaries
involved approximately one percent of the subsidiaries' total
purchases. 12 Although the subsidiaries were largely autonomous
with regard to personnel and day-to-day management,'3 Container
Corporation established "general standards of professionalism,
profitability and ethical practices"'14 for its subsidiaries, and major
policy decisions of the subsidiaries were subject to review by
Container Corporation. Container Corporation provided advice
and consultation on a variety of subjects and occasionally assisted
in the procurement of equipment by the subsidiaries.15 In addi-
tion, Container Corporation directly held or guaranteed approxi-
mately one-half of the subsidiaries' long-term debt.16
On the basis of these relationships between Container Corpora-
tion and its subsidiaries, the California Superior Court held that
parent and subsidiaries constituted a unitary-business.' 7 As a uni-
tary-business, Container Corporation was subject to the apportion-
ment of its worldwide income in order to determine the amount of
income attributable to California. The inclusion of the foreign sub-
7. A vertically integrated business involves a series of enterprises which, in ef-
fect, comprise one enterprise through common linkage in a production chain
involving a single product.
For example, without exception each of the large steel firms of our
economy-United States Steel, Bethlehem Steel, Republic Steel, and
the others-are vertical combinations of plants; each firm owns ore
and coal mines, limestone quarries, coke ovens, blast furnaces, roll-
ing mills, forge shops, foundaries, and, in some cases, fabricating
shops.
C. McCoNNELL, ECONOMICS 134 (7th ed. 1978).
8. See infra note 18.
9. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2943 (1983).
These subsidiaries were located in Columbia, Mexico, Venezuela, Panama,
Austria, Germany, Holland, and Italy. WhiteNack, supra note 3, at 773.
10. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2943 (1983).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. Container Corporation occasionally filled personnel positions that sub-
sidiaries could not, with Container Corporation personnel.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2944.
16. Id.
17. The California Superior Court decision was affirmed by the California Court
of Appeal in Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 117 Cal. App.
3d 988, 173 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1981), and the California Supreme Court declined
discretionary review.
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sidiaries as part of Container Corporation's unitary-business in-
creased the amount of total income subject to apportionment,
while decreasing the percentage of total income attributable to
California. The net effect of the inclusion of the foreign subsidiar-
ies was to increase Container Corporation's tax liablity in Califor-
nia for each of the years involved. 8
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court,' 9 Container
Corporation contested the application of California's taxation
method on three grounds. First, Container Corporation disputed
the finding of a unitary-business consisting of itself and its foreign
subsidiaries. Second, Container Corporation claimed that, even if
a unitary-business did exist, differences in international economic
conditions caused a distortion of income when the apportionment
method was applied, which warranted rejection of the worldwide
income apportionment. Third, Container Corporation claimed that
states' use of the unitary-business concept across national bounda-
ries and the apportionment of worldwide income violated the for-
eign commerce clause because the method resulted in double
taxation and violated federal uniformity in the international
sphere.
18. Container Corporation's calculations of its unitary-business tax liability, ex-
cluding foreign subsidiaries, are summarized in Table 1. California's calcula-
tions are summarized in Table 2.
TABLE 1
CONTAINER CORPORATION CALCULATIONS
1963 1964 1965
Total income of unitary busi-
ness $26,870,427.00 $28,774,320.48 $32,280,842.90
Percentage attributed to Calif. 11.041% 10.6422% 9.8336%
Amount attributed to Calif. 2,966,763.85 3,062,220.73 3,174,368.97
Tax (5.5%) 163,172.01 168,422.14 174,590.29
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2945 (1983)
(citing Joint Appendix to Briefs, Exhibit A-7).
TABLE 2
CALIFORNIA CALCULATxIONS
1963 1964 1965
Total income of unitary
business $37,348,183.00 $44,245,879.00 $46,884,968.00
Percentage attributed to Calif. 8.6886% 8.3135% 7.6528%
Amount attributed to Calif. 3,245,034.23 3,673,381.15 3,588,012.68
Tax (5.5%) 178,476.88 202,310.95 197,340.70
Id.
19. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, reh'g denied,
104 S.Ct. 265 (1983).
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This Article will examine the Supreme Court's holding on each
of the three contested issues. First will be an examination of the
fundamental principles of the unitary-business determination, in-
cluding a discussion of the constitutional restraints placed upon
states using the unitary-business method and the discretion al-
lowed by the Supreme Court in unitary-business determinations
made by state courts. Second will be an examination of the distor-
tion of income produced when the unitary-business/formula ap-
portionment method is applied despite differences in international
economic conditions and the amount of income distortion the
Court appears willing to accept. Finally will be an examination of
the foreign commerce clause considerations of double taxation and
federal uniformity in the international sphere. The analysis of the
double taxation issue will include a discussion of the level of scru-
tiny applied by the Court in cases of international double taxation.
The federal uniformity analysis will include an examination of the
Court's tests for determining state violation of federal uniformity,
and will apply those tests to the facts presented by the Container
case.
II. UNITARY-BUSINESS AND INCOME DISTORTION
A. The Unitary-Business Determination
The first step in the process of apportionment of income is deter-
mining the existence of a unitary-business. 20 Determination of a
unitary-business, for the purpose of apportionment of income, is
subject to constitutional analysis under the due process and com-
merce clauses. 21 The test used by the Court in this analysis in-
volves an inquiry into 1) whether there exists a "minimal
connection" or "nexus" between the interstate or international ac-
tivities and the taxing state,22 and 2) whether there exists "a ra-
tional relationship between the income attributed to the State and
the intrastate values of the enterprise. '23 In ASARCO, Inc. v.
20. In the field of state corporate income taxation, the Court has consistently
held that "the linchpin of apportionability. . . is the unitary-business princi-
ple." Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 439 (1980). See
also F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354 (1982)
(citing the "linchpin" language of Mobil Oil); ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State
Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982).
21. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2940 (1983).
22. Id. at 2940. The same language was used by the Court in Exxon Corp. v. De-
partment of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 219 (1980) and Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commis-
sioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 437 (1980).
23. Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 219-20 (1980) (quoting
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425,437 (1980)). By "intra-
state values," the Court is referring to aspects of the enterprise, particularly
those that go into the production of income, which are located in the taxing
19841
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Idaho State Tax Commisson,24 the Court further refined the test,
requiring that some bond of ownership or control uniting the uni-
tary-business be found.25
Functionally, these principles require the taxing state to
demonstrate a sharing or exchange of value 26 between entities
sought to be treated as a unitary-business. The Court has permit-
ted a finding of a unitary-business in cases involving vertically in-
tegrated businesses with components in different states 27 or
nations, 28 and enterprises of a similar nature operating separately
but involving common managerial or operational resources. 29 Par-
ticularly in this latter category of separately operating but linked
enterprises, organizational and operational characteristics are ex-
amined to determine if economies of scale or transfers of value ex-
ist. From 1980 to 1982, the Court further refined this concept
through its application in a number of cases. 30
state. These aspects include more than just physical assets, such as plants
and equipment. Such items as technical expertise of personnel located in the
taxing state and sales occurring in the taxing state also constitute valuable
aspects of an enterprise located in the taxing state.
24. 458 U.S. 307 (1982).
25. Id. at 322-23.
26. A sharing or exchange of value, also referred to as a transfer of value, exists
when two or more distinct entities are able to take advantage of one another
by virtue of their close affiliation. Examples of this include economies of
scale and situations in which entities are able to share valuable information.
See generally McClure, Operational Interdependence is Not the Appropriate
"Bright Line Test" of a Unitary-Business-At Least Not Now, 18 TAX NoTES
107 (1983). Due to close affiliations of entities (e.g., the parent-subsidiary re-
lationship), such transfers of value often do not appear on the books of the
value-giving entity as producing income.
27. See, e.g., Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
28. See e.g., Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271
(1924).
29. See, e.g., Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942). Linkage through com-
mon managerial or operational resources particularly involves situations
where entities are sharing managerial expertise or assistance in various as-
pects of operation such as personnel, equipment, or supplies. See supra note
26.
30. In Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. 425 (1980), the Court found that foreign source dividend
income from Mobil's integrated petroleum enterprise was earned in a course
of activities related to the sale of petroleum in Vermont, and was therefore
includable as part of the income of the unitary-business. In Exxon Corp. v.
Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980), Exxon Corporation operated
three separate functional departments--exploration and production, refining,
and marketing-of which only the marketing department operated in Wiscon-
sin. Nonetheless, the Court held that, due to the interrelationship between
the various departments as part of a vertically integrated business, the mar-
keting department was part of a unitary-business consisting of all three de-
partments and subject to apportionment of its total income in Wisconsin.
In ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982), the Court
found that no unitary-business existed, despite the fact that the parent-cor-
[Vol. 63:631
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Container Corporation argued on appeal that the test as devel-
oped by the Court over the past fifty years was too nebulous, per-
mitting the state courts too much discretion in the determination
of a unitary-business. As an alternative, Container Corporation
proposed that the Court adopt a "bright line" test,31 whereby a uni-
tary-business would be established only if the taxing state could
show a substantial flow of goods between affiliated entities.32
Container Corporation argued that such a bright line test would be
more objective, providing a more reasonable basis for the unitary-
business determination. 33 Support for the use of the "flow of
goods" test was found in the language of the ASARCO opinion 34
and in previous cases 35 in which the Court found a unitary-busi-
ness based on "a continuous flow and interchange of common
products."36
The Court, in brief reference to the issue, declined to adopt the
"flow of goods" test as the sole criterion for determination of a uni-
tary-business.37 While a state may, if it chooses, adopt the "flow of
goods" test as an exclusive test for determining the existence of a
unitary-business, 38 the Court maintained that it is constitutionally
permissible for the state to analyze whether a flow of value, as op-
posed to a flow of goods, is demonstrable. 39 The "flow of goods"
poration owned approximately 51 percent of its subsidiaries' stock, on the ba-
sis of the parent's management agreement with other shareholders to not
assert control over the subsidiaries and evidence that the parent had re-
frained from exercising its potential to control the subsidiaries. Similarly, in
F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354 (1982), a
parent's potential to control its subsidiaries was not proof of a unitary-busi-
ness; based on a lack of subsidiary-parent integration or management cen-
tralization, the Court declined to find a unitary-business relationship.
31. Brief for Appellant on the Merits at 47, Container Corp. of America v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933 (1983).
32. Id.
33. An in-depth analysis of the various arguments in support of and in opposition
to the "flow of goods" test is beyond the scope of this Article. Arguments in
support of the test include its objective limitations on state court determina-
tions and the use of cost spreading by corporations through accounting proce-
dures. Arguments in opposition to the test include primarily those in favor of
apportionment generally: the existence of value transfers that arise without
any flow of goods and the distrust of separate accounting procedures. For an
excellent treatment of the opposing views compare Hellerstein, Recent Devel-
opments in State Tax Apportionment and the Circumscription of Unitary
Business, 21 NAT'L TAX. J. 487, 501-502 (1968), with McClure, supra note 26.
34. 458 U.S. 307, 330 n.24 (1982).
35. Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980); Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
36. ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 330 n.24 (1982).
37. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2947 (1983).
38. Id. at 2947 n.17.
39. Id. at 2947.
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test is one of many possible analyses that a state may use in its
unitary-business determination. The Court's refusal to accept the
"flow of goods" test as the sole test reaffirms the functional inquiry
into "contributions to income resulting from functional integration,
centralization of management, and economies of scale."40
Having failed in its attempt to limit the unitary-business test to
"flow of goods," Container Corporation was forced into an analysis
of its corporate activities under the broader "flow of value" test
and the ownership or control inquiry. Under this analysis, the tax-
payer has the burden of showing by "clear and cogent evidence"
that extraterritorial values are being taxed.4 1 'This burden is
never met merely by showing a fair difference of opinion which as
an original matter might be decided differently."42 Rather than re-
view "findings of fact supported by substantial evidence," 43 the
"Court will, if reasonably possible, defer to the judgment of state
courts in deciding whether a particular set of activities constitutes
a 'unitary-business.'"44 The Court's preference for deferring to
judgments of the state courts creates a "realm of permissible judg-
ment,"45 in which the state courts will not be reversed.46
Container Corporation argued that the California trial court's
determination was made "under a different legal standard,"47
claiming that the court had improperly relied on Container Corpo-
ration's potential to control various operations of its subsidiaries
rather than any actual control exercised.48 Container Corporation
claimed that, though it had potential review of its subsidiaries' de-
cisions, no actual control or review had occurred, and therefore no
unitary-business relationship existed.4 9 Both Container Corpora-
tion and the California Franchise Tax Board agreed, however, that
"major policy decisions of the subsidiaries were subject to review"
40. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 438 (1980). See also
F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354, 364 (1982).
41. Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 221 (1980).
42. Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534, 537-38 (1951).
43. Id. at 538.
44. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2945 (1983).
45. See Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534, 538 (1951); Container
Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2946 (1983).
46. See infra note 57.
47. Brief for Appellant on the Merits at 43. See also supra note 30.
48. In addition to the "control" issue, Container Corporation claimed that there
was no support for a unitary-business finding. Container Corporation alleged
that an insignificant flow of goods between itself and its subsidiaries existed,
and that its foreign operations staff was extremely limited. Brief for Appel-
lant on the Merits at 42. However, the Supreme Court's decision appears to
rely solely on the control of subsidiaries factor as being sufficient to support
the finding of a unitary-business.
49. Id. at 44.
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by Container Corporation.50 The state court had found that high-
level officials of Container Corporation gave the subsidiaries direc-
tions regarding compliance with standards of professionalism,
profitability, and ethical practices.5 1L Other factors pointed to by
the state court in its finding of actual control included Container
Corporation's role in providing and guaranteeing loans to its sub-
sidiaries, 52 considerable interplay in the area of corporate expan-
sion,53 and Container Corporation's acts of providing its
subsidiaries with substantial technical assistance.54 These factors,
taken together, convinced the Supreme Court that the state court
had reached a conclusion within the realm of permissible
judgment.
55
The Container decision appears to grant the state courts broad
discretion in the determination of a unitary-business, circum-
scribed only by the boundaries of the judicially created realm of
permissible judgment. Criticism has been leveled at this broad
discretion and its ramifications.55 These criticisms include the im-
precise and nebulous nature of the test, the virtual impossibility of
obtaining a reversal of an initial state court unitary-business deter-
mination,5 7 and the preclusion of appeals by any but gargantuan
businesses.58 The alternative bright line test, however, has its own
disadvantages-most importantly, the problem of arbitrary
classification.59
The advantages and disadvantages of the certainty of the bright
line approach must be weighed. Here, the Court has refused use of
bright line tests, having rejected both the "flow of goods" test and
50. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 117 Cal. App. 3d 988, 998, 173
Cal. Rptr. 121, 127 (1981).
51. Id. at 998, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 127-28.
52. Id. at 997, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
53. "Although there was no continued effort by appellant Container Corporation
of America to solicit business for its foreign subsidiaries, on at least one occa-
sion appellant assisted in the negotiation of a contract for a foreign subsidi-
ary." Id.
54. Id. at 998-99, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
55. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2948 (1983).
56. See e.g., WhiteNack, supra note 3.
57. In both the ASARCO and Woolworth cases, the Supreme Court's reversal of
the unitary-business determination relied, to a great extent, on the 'factual
findings made by the [lower] state courts" that no unitary-business existed.
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2946 n.15
(1983) (emphasis in original).
58. WhiteNack, supra note 3, at 776.
59. McClure, supra note 26. A bright line test could result in either over-inclusion
or under-inclusion of enterprises as a unitary-business, depending upon
which test is adopted. For example, the bright line "corporate purpose" test,
discussed infra note 60, would clearly be over-inclusive.
1984]
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the "corporate purpose" test.60 As a matter of policy and permissi-
ble state taxation, the Court has left the limitation of unitary-busi-
ness determinations to legislative action, constrained only by
broad constitutional limitations.61 Considering the various ways in
which affiliated business entities may share or transfer value,62 the
Court's reaffirmation of the "flow of value" test appears to recog-
nize the practical realities of corporate taxation. Any limitation of
state corporate income taxation more restrictive than the "flow of
value" test involves numerous political and tax policy decisions at
the state and national levels. These policy decisions are much bet-
ter suited to legislative determination than to Supreme Court
determination.
B. Distortion of Income through Apportionment
Once the existence of a unitary-business has been established
by the taxing state, that state generally has the authority to appor-
tion the income of that unitary-business to the state rather than
accept the income figure attributed to the state through separate
accounting methods.6 3 In challenging the figure derived through
apportionment, the taxpayer has the burden of proving that "there
is no rational relationship between the income attributed to the
state and the intrastate values of the enterprise."64 Such a chal-
lenge of an apportionment formula is evaluated under the due pro-
cess and commerce clauses, to determine if the apportionment
formula is fair.65
In this analysis, the Court employs two components of fairness:
internal consistency and external consistency of the apportion-
ment formula. Internal consistency of the formula involves
whether, if applied by every taxing jurisdiction, the formula would
result in taxation of an income greater than the income of the uni-
tary-business. 66 External consistency involves whether the appor-
60. In ASARCO, the Idaho State Commission had proposed the use of a test
which would deem a series of affiliated corporations unitary if the parent had
acquired, managed, or disposed of subsidiaries for purposes "relating or con-
tributing to the [parent] taxpayer's business." ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State
Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 326 (1982). The Court in ASARCO claimed that
such a test would destroy the unitary-business concept by making all invest-
ments and operations part of a unitary-business as a result of the corporate
purpose to earn money or provide a return on the investment of capital. Id.
61. See supra note 21-25 and accompanying text.
62. See McClure, supra note 26.
63. The authority to apportion income rather than accept separate accounting
figures is grounded in a long line of cases beginning with Bass, Ratcliff &
Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924).
64. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436 (1980).
65. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2942 (1983).
66. The Container Court apparently concluded that the three-factor apportion-
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tionment formula actually produces a reasonable picture of the
generation of income. Under the external consistency component,
the taxpayer corporation does not meet its burden of proof by
merely showing that the apportionment formula may result in the
taxation of income that did not have its source in the taxing state. 67
The taxpayer, to invalidate use of an apportionment formula, must
present "clear and cogent evidence"68 that the income apportioned
to the state is "out of all appropriate proportion to the business
transacted... in that State,"69 or has "led to a grossly distorted
result."
70
The apportionment formula used by California is the three-fac-
tor formula.7 ' The three-factor formula was approved by the
Supreme Court in Butler Bros. v. McColgan,7 2 and the Court has
recognized the formula as a "benchmark against which other ap-
portionment formulas are judged,"73 in cases involving income ap-
portionment of unitary-businesses with interstate operations. 74
Despite the fairness attributed to the three-factor formula by
the Court in the taxation of interstate enterprises, Container Cor-
poration argued that, for international enterprises, the three-factor
formula produces a distortion of income warranting its rejection.7 5
Container Corporation claimed that it operated entirely within the
United States, and that each of its subsidiaries operated entirely
within a foreign nation.7 6 Container Corporation's distortion argu-
ments centered on the practical differences between economic
ment formula satisfies the internal consistency test. In fact, almost any
formula would satisfy the internal consistency test, as long as it uniformly
applied to all corporations. An example of a formula that may fail the inter-
nal consistency test is a formula that draws a distinction between domiciliary
and non-domiciliary corporations, through such means as utilizing different
formula ratios based on the domicile of the corporation. For example, if
states A and B each taxed all of the income of domiciliary corporations and
apportioned income of non-domiciliary corporations, any corporation domi-
ciled in one state and operating in both states would be taxed on more than
10O percent of its income.
67. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2942 (1983)
(citing Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 272 (1978)).
68. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2942 (1983).
69. Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123, 135
(1931).
70. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317, 326 (1968).
71. See supra note 3.
72. 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
73. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax. Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2943 (1983).
74. Cases involving income apportionment of unitary-businesses with interstate
operations include: Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978); General
Motors Corp. v. Washington, 337 U.S. 436 (1964); Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v.
North Carolina ex rel Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
75. Brief for Appellant on the Merits at 11.
76. Id.
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conditions in the United States and foreign nations. According to
Container Corporation, California's apportionment scheme neces-
sarily ignored differences in economic conditions, particularly dif-
ferences in payroll costs and profitability, which resulted in a
distortion in the apportionment of income by shifting the income
from low cost/high profitability jurisdictions to high cost/low prof-
itability jurisdictions.77 To support these claims of income shift-
ing, Container Corporation presented evidence of differing wage
rates78 between the United States and various foreign nations.
77. Id. at 12.
78. Container Corporation pointed to statistics showing that wage rates in less
developed countries are significantly lower than the wage rate in the United
States.
TABLE 3
HouRLY EARNINGS RATES TRANSLATED INTO UNITED STATES DOLLAS FOR
WAGE EARNERS IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIESt
Country
United States ...............................
Australia ....................................
Austria ......................................
Belgium .....................................
Canada .....................................
Ceylon ......................................
Chile ........................................
Colombia ...................................
Denm ark ....................................
El Salvador .................................
Finland .....................................
France ......................................
Germ any ....................................
Ghana ......................................
Greece ......................................
Guatemala ..................................
Ireland ......................................
Israel .......................................
Italy ........................................
Japan .......................................
K orea .......................................
M exico ......................................
New Zealand ................................
Norway .....................................
Year
1963 1964 1965
2.46 2.53 2.61
2.05 2.11 2.21
1.43 1.49 1.54
.55 .60 .65
.74 .83 .90
.45 .51 .56
1.80 1.88 1.97
.15 .15 .16
.24 .30 .32
.30 .30 .23
1.17 1.27 1.43
.28 .28 .29
.81 .92 1.00
.54 .58 .61
.87 .94 1.03
.70 .76 .35
.28 .31 .34
.36 .36 .37
1.40 1.55 1.65
.58 .64 .73
.54 .59 .62
.43 .48 .52
.14 .09 .10
.48 .53 .56
2.33 2.44 2.59
1.11 1.18 1.28
.77 .83 .92
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Similar evidence was presented regarding profitability.
7 9
Container Corporation contended that this greater profitability of
foreign subsidiaries caused the basic premise of combined appor-
tionment (that a given amount of any income factor produces the
TABLE 3 (continued)
HOURLY EARNINGS RATES TRANSLATED INrO UNITED STATES DOLLARS FOR
WAGE EARNERS IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIESt
Year
Country Sex 1963 1964 1965
Peru ........................................ M F .32 .35 .35
Philippines .................................. MF .23 .23 .22
Puerto Rico ................................. MF 1.13 1.18 1.24
Sweden ..................................... MF 1.41 1.54 1.69
Switzerland ................................. M .98 1.06 1.14
United Kingdom ............................. M 2.48 2.67 2.93
t UNITED NATIONS, MONTHLY BULLETIN OF STATISTICS, Table 57 at 32 (Jan.
1968).
* M refers to wages of males, F refers to wages of females, and MF to a
single composite figure. Figures normally include bonuses, cost of living
allowances, taxes, social insurance contributions payable by the employed
person and, in some cases, payments in kind. They normally exclude so-
cial insurance contributions payable by the employers, family allowances
and other social security benefits.
79. Container Corporation argued that wage rate differences were not off-set by
lower productivity (see Table 4), and that the amount of each of the three
factors (payroll, sales, and property) required to produce one dollar of net
income was lower in foreign nations (see Table 5).
TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE OF U.S. AVERAGE HOURLY COMPENSATION, ADJUSTED FOR
ESTIMATED DIFFERENCES IN PRODUCTIVITYt
Country 1969 1970
Japan ........................................................ 40 40
W est Germany ............................................... 61 72
United Kingdom .............................................. 65 68
Belgium ...................................................... 60 61
Canada ...................................................... 79 82
France ....................................................... 58 54
Italy ......................................................... 62 67
Netherlands .................................................. 74 71
Sweden ...................................................... 72 74
t UNITED STATES TARIF COMM'N, T.C. PUB. 473, COMPETITIVENESS OF U.S. IN-
DUSTRIES 30 (1972).
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same amount of income regardless of the locale of the factor)80 to
break down when applied to foreign operations. 8 1 As additonal ev-
idence of the validity of this contention, Container Corporation
pointed to the higher "hurdle rate" (minimum return on invest-
ment) that U.S. companies require for investing in foreign opera-
tions.8 2 The apportionment of worldwide rather than domestic
income allegedly resulted in a distortion of income attributed to
California of approximately fourteen percent.83
The Court rejected Container Corporation's claims as failing to
impeach the basic rationale behind use of the three-factor formula
by states. The Court reasoned that Container Corporation's argu-
ments and evidence were "based on precisely the sort of formal
geographical accounting whose basic theoretical weaknesses jus-
tify resort to formula apportionment."84 Because inherent flaws in
separate accounting methods make them suspect of reducing the
TABLE 5
AMOUNT REQUIRED TO PRODUCE $1.00 OF NET INCOME
FOR THE YEARS 1963-65t
Country Payroll Sales Property
United States ................................. $3.34 $10.65 $4.83
Colombia ..................................... 0.27 5.17 4.74
M exico ........................................ 1.53 10.69 6.29
Venezuela ..................................... 0.81 4.73 3.40
Germany ...................................... 3.95 17.62 9.73
Netherlands ................................... 0.96 7.98 1.59
t Brief for Appellants on the Merits at 18. These figures were derived by
dividing the net income produced in each country by the respective sales,
payroll, and property factors for that country.
80. See Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2950 n.20
(1983).
81. Brief for Appellant on the Merits at 14 (referring to testimony of expert wit-
ness Prof. John C. McDonald of Stanford University). Because each dollar of
a factor located in a foreign country produces a greater income, the assump-
tion that locale makes no difference in income production has the effect of
shifting income to the domestic locale with lower income production.
82. Id. The Court appears to have dismissed the issue as a slight imperfection,
referring to the variety of factors which influence foreign investments. See
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2950 n.20
(1983).
83. Brief for Appellant on the Merits at 16; Container Corp. of America v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2950 (1983). This distortion figure is based
on the difference between California's apportionment figure and Container
Corporation's separate accounting figure. See supra note 18.
84. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2948 (1983).
The "basic theoretical weaknesses" of separate accounting methods include
imprecision, the possibilities of manipulation by corporations in order to re-
duce taxes, and an inadequate ability to capture many types of transfers of
value.
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income attributed to a state, a difference between separate ac-
counting methods and formula apportionment in the amount of in-
come attributed to a state does not necessarily indicate a
distortion of income by the formula apportionment method.85 The
very rationale behind the use of formula apportionment by states
is that it will result in the attribution of a greater amount of income
to the state than separate accounting methods. The justification,
from the state's standpoint, is that the larger attribution of income
to the state is actually the result of additional income, produced by
factors of income production located in the taxing state, which
does not appear "on the books" of the corporation through sepa-
rate accounting methods.
While the Court recognized that the three-factor formula is im-
perfect,86 it also recognized that separate accounting is imper-
fect.8 7 The Court concluded that Container Corporation had failed
to present any evidence which would indicate that the margin of
error is greater for apportionment than for separate accounting.88
In Hans Rees' Sons, Inc., v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell,89 the
Court had held that the single-factor formula used by North Caro-
lina90 resulted in an attribution of income to the state out of any
reasonable proportion to the enterprise's activities in the state.
The difference between the amount of income attributed to North
Carolina under separate accounting and that attributed under ap-
portionment was 250 percent. In Container, only a 14 percent dif-
ference was demonstrated. The Court found this 14 percent
difference fell "within the substantial margin of error inherent in
any method" of income attribution.9 1
85. For example, if separate accounting methods indicate that one dollar is at-
tributable to the state as income, and formula apportionment indicates that
two dollars are attributable as income, the formula apportionment method
has not necessarily distorted the income picture; it may be that the amount
attributed through separate accounting is a distortion, and the apportion-
ment figure may be the correct amount.
86. "First, the one-third-each weight given to the three factors is essentially arbi-
trary. Second, payroll, property, and sales still do not exhaust the entire set
of factors arguably relevant to the production of income. Finally, the relation-
ship between each of the factors and income is by no means exact."
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2949-50 n.20
(1983).
87. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
88. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2949-50
(1983). If the respective margins of error in the two methods of attribution
are equal (or approximately equal), then the Court would have no reason to
prefer one method over the other and should leave the decision to the states.
89. 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
90. The single factor utilized by North Carolina in its apportionment formula had
been the ownership of tangible property. Id. at 125.
91. 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2950 (1983).
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The important question left open by the Container decision is:
How substantial is the margin of error the Court considers inher-
ent in income attribution? Aside from the reference to the "sub-
stantial margin of error" which the Court appears to consider to be
an acceptable amount of distortion, the Court failed to provide an
indication of how much distortion is too much, other than the 250
percent difference noted in Hans Rees' Sons and the reference to
impermissibly gross distortion.92 Taken together, Hans Rees' Sons
and Container suggest a broad range of allowable distortion, which
in future litigation may compel the courts to attempt to specify
outside limits on the amount of alleged distortion (based on the
difference between separate accounting and apportionment
figures) that will be considered constitutionally permissible. The
Court's reluctance to draw a line indicating what percentage differ-
ential is too great appears to be grounded in the difficulty of ap-
praising the distortion inherent in the two income attribution
methods and the Court's apparent preference for granting the
states wide latitude in the application of the unitary-business/
formula apportionment method.
93
III. FOREIGN COMMERCE CONSIDERATIONS
Had Container Corporation's unitary-business been entirely
domestic, the Court's analysis of the California apportionment
method would have concluded with the unitary-business and in-
come distortion issues.94 However, the international character of
the taxation in Container presented additional constitutional con-
siderations under the foreign commerce clause. While California
and a number of other states95 have adopted the worldwide income
apportionment approach for taxation of multinational unitary-
businesses, the federal government and the foreign jurisdictions in
which Container Corporation's subsidiaries operate utilize a form
92. See id. at 2948-49.
93. If the Court were to establish a limit as to the percentage of permissible dis-
tortion, an additional problem might result. Corporations would have an in-
centive to manipulate their separate accounting procedures to create a
differential over the limit specified by the Court. By leaving impermissible
distortion an "open" question, the Court has provided itself and state courts
the opportunity to carefully review the record of each case when deciding the
distortion issue.
94. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2950 (1983).
95. At this writing, twelve states have adopted the worldwide income approach to
apportionment: Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Massa-
chusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon and Utah. Uni-
tary Tax, supra note 6, at G-6. Florida adopted the worldwide approach
immediately after the Court announced the Container decision. Court's
Blueprint used by Florida in Unitary Tax Law, DAILy TAX REPORT (BNA)
No. 136, at G-5 (July 14, 1983).
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of separate accounting analysis commonly known as the "arm's-
length" approach.96 This difference in approach to the taxation of
multinationals produces considerations involving double taxation
and federal uniformity in the international context.
A. Double Taxation
Under the internationally accepted arm's-length approach to
corporate income attribution,97 foreign nations have the right to
tax all of the income attributed to those nations by separate ac-
counting methods. Container Corporation claimed that use of
formula apportionment by states results in the attribution of some
of that foreign-taxed income to the United States, resulting in the
income being taxed twice.98 The Court had recognized in Japan
Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,99 that "[elven a slight overlap-
ping of tax-a problem that might be deemed de minimis in a do-
mestic context-assumes importance when sensitive matters of
foreign relations and national sovereignty are concerned." 0 0
Container Corporation argued such actual double taxation existed
in its case, and therefore, the Court should strike down the use of
apportionment in the international context.
In its foreign commerce analysis of double taxation, the Court
applied a level of scrutiny in which it considered the context in
96. Under the arm's-length approach, every corporation, even if closely
tied to other corporations, is treated for most-but decidedly not
all-purposes as if it were an independent entity dealing at arm's
length with its affiliated corporations, and subject to taxation only by
the jurisdictions in which it operates and only for the income it real-
izes on its own books.
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2950 (1983).
97. Brief for Appellant on the Merits at 30.
98. Container Corporation claimed that approximately four million dollars of ad-
ditional income attributed to the United States during the years at issue was
also taxed in the foreign nation to which it was attributed through separate
accounting. Brief for Appellant on the Merits at 21.
99. 441 U.S. 434 (1979) (striking down property tax on cargo shipping containers
owned, based, and registered abroad because containers were used exclu-
sively in international commerce and because containers were subjected to
full taxation by the nation in which they were based).
100. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 456 (1979) (footnote
omitted). Matters of foreign tax or trade retaliation by foreign nations
against the United States arise from the threat of double taxation. In addi-
tion, there is no international forum in which to adjust formulas and their
application to avoid double taxation problems. Container Corporation ar-
gued: "Where [domestic] apportionment formulas conflict, the Court can de-
termine whether any one formula is to blame and invalidate the unfair
formula. In foreign commerce, however, no tribunal exists to ensure that in-
come earned in foreign commerce is taxed in the aggregate only once." Brief
for Appellant on the Merits at 24.
1984]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
which the double taxation occurs' 0 1 and the alternatives reason-
ably available to the taxing state. 0 2 While relying heavily on the
double taxation analysis of Japan Line, the Court refused to re-
quire the states to use the internationally accepted arm's-length
approach.
The context of the taxation in Container involved closely linked
entities operating in essentially the same business. 0 3 While the
arm's-length approach urged by Container Corporation generally
accepts the enterprise's separate accounting figures, the approach
also recognizes the possibility of transfers of value between closely
affiliated entities, in much the same vein as formula apportion-
ment. 0 4 From this perspective, the worldwide income apportion-
ment approach is not so far out of step with the approach generally
101. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2953 (1983).
The "context" includes the type of business and entities involved and the
international setting in which the taxation takes place.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2943.
104. In rejecting Container Corporation's analysis in support of the arm's-length
method, and recognizing the similarities between formula apportionment and
the arm's-length method, the Court pointed to a provision of United States
tax law:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades or businesses
(whether or not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United
States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or
indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary may distribute, appor-
tion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances be-
tween or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he
determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is
necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the
income of any such organizations, trades, or businesses.
I.R.C. § 482 (1976). The Treasury Regulations implementing this section pro-
vide in part:
The authority to determine true taxable income extends to any case
in which either by inadvertence or design the taxable income, in
whole or in part, of a controlled taxpayer, is other than it would have
been had the taxpayer in the conduct of his affairs been an uncon-
trolled taxpayer dealing at arm's-length with another uncontrolled
taxpayer.
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c) (1968). This regulation relies primarily on the clear-
reflection-of-income portion of I.R.C. § 482. In Ruddick Corp. v. United States,
643 F.2d 747 (Ct. Cl. 1981), the Court of Claims held that "the presence of a
business purpose or the absence of any plan to lessen taxes does not, in and
of itself, exclude the operation of the [§ 482] provision." Id. at 750. As indi-
cated previously, the Court has imposed a constitutional requirement on the
unitary-business determination that a bond of ownership or control be found.
See supra note 25 and accompanying text. Thus, § 482, as interpreted by both
the Treasury Department and the courts, appears to operate in a manner akin
to formula apportionment, i.e., attempts to more closely capture the true gen-
eration of income despite separate accounting figures and formal divisions of
entities.
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used in the international context. 0 5
The setting in which the double taxation occurs directly affects
the alternatives available to the taxing state in any attempt to
avoid double taxation. The double taxation in Japan Line had
been almost entirely avoidable by adherence to the international
rule of not taxing cargo containers "owned, based, and registered
abroad ... that are used exclusively in international com-
merce."10 6 The Container Court found no similar rule to avoid
double taxation. 0 7 Even the arm's-length approach, with its provi-
sions for dealing with controlled entities, 0 8 and with its differing
rules among nations in its use,109 poses a risk of double taxation
which the Court considered to be roughly equivalent to the threat
posed by the formula apportionment method.11O In addition, the
double taxation posed by the formula apportionment method is
not inevitable; the method may result in no double taxation or
even an under-taxation in which less than the total income of the
unitary-business is subjected to taxation."' Finally, the Court dis-
missed the alternative of requiring states to adopt a method of tax-
ation which would not result in any international double taxation.
If such an alternative were adopted and carried to its logical ex-
treme, the Court found that it would require states to defer "to a
variety of... reallocation decisions made by individual foreign
countries in individual cases."' 12 The Court, finding this require-
ment to be too extreme, stated that "although double taxation is a
constitutionally disfavored"13 state of affairs, particularly in the in-
ternational context, Japan Line does not require forbearance so
extreme or so one-sided.""4
The bottom line of the Court's opinion appears to rest on the
105. The Container Court found other nations to have similar provisions for evalu-
ating the income attribution of controlled entities. 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2953 (1983).
106. 441 U.S. 434, 444 (1979).
107. The Court mentioned the alternative of not taxing a multinational corpora-
tion's income at all. 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2953 (1983). Such an alternative, however,
is plainly unfair, and was discussed by the Court only to highlight the ab-
sence of a feasible alternative.
108. See supra note 104.
109. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2954 (1983).
110. Id.
111. For example, in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Lenckos, 84 Ill. 2d 102, 417 N.E.2d
1343 (1981), appeal dismissed sub nom. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Caterpil-
lar Tractor Co., 457 U.S. 1103 (1983), the court ruled that Caterpillar Tractor
was entitled to a tax refund as a result of the application of the unitary-busi-
ness doctrine and formula apportionment.
112. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2955 (1983).
113. Constitutional disfavor is not to be equated with constitutional prohibition.
Id. at 2953. While double taxation is to be avoided whenever possible, the
Court has not absolutely prohibited the existence of all double taxation.
114. Id. at 2955.
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nature of the threat of double taxation. While California's tax in
Container resulted in actual double taxation, as long as double
taxation under the apportionment method is not inevitable and
double taxation under the arm's-length method remains a possibil-
ity, the Court found no compulsion to strike down the apportion-
ment system. This result is not surprising, considering the Court's
acceptance of the states' suspicions of separate accounting meth-
ods of income attribution.115 Given what it concluded to be two
taxing systems that posed similar threats of double taxation, and
the lack of a feasible alternative, the Court appears to have ac-
cepted what it considers to be a tolerable level of double taxation,
even in the international context. The Court's acceptance of some
double taxation as tolerable appears to be justified. While no in-
ternational judicial forum exists to avoid the problems of double
taxation,116 multinational corporations are not without recourse to
Congress to seek their desired result. Given this legislative alter-
native, the Court's refusal to require the states to adjust their taxa-
tion to the vagaries of other nations' methods appears sound. A
crucial question which remains is: What are the limits of this toler-
able double taxation? The answer to this question is probably
linked to the income distortion issue,117 because both the distor-
tion and the international double taxation issues involve, in es-
sence, income being taxed twice as a result of the method of
income attribution. However, the tolerable limits on international
double taxation may be more strict than the limits on income dis-
tortion (particularly income distortion in the domestic context),
due to the sensitivity the Court evidences toward international
matters.118
B. Federal Uniformity 19
Because of the possible international repercussions 20
presented by the California tax, an additional inquiry under the
foreign commerce clause is whether the apportionment method
"impair[s] federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity
115. See supra notes 5 & 84 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 100.
117. See supra Section 11(B) of text.
118. See Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 456 (1979). For
discussion of underlying reasons for this sensitivity, see supra note 100.
119. At the outset, it should be noted that the federal uniformity involved in this
case is not the federal tax uniformity of Art. I, § 8, cl. 1 of the Constitution.
Article I, § 8, cl. 1 refers to uniformity of federal taxes as applied to the states.
The federal uniformity involved in Container refers to the United States
speaking with one-voice in matters of foreign policy and international trade.
120. See infra notes 134-138 and accompanying text.
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is essential."' 2 ' This inquiry does not invalidate a state tax when
the tax "has foreign resonances, but does not implicate foreign af-
fairs,"'1 22 unless Congress has explicitly directed the states to con-
form to a single approach. 23 The determination of whether a state
tax violates federal uniformity involves a two-step analysis,
whereby the tax will be invalidated if it either:
1) is in violation of a clear federal directive; or
2) "implicates foreign policy issues which must be left to the
Federal Government."124
While Congress has not enacted federal statutes to pre-empt
state legislation in this area,125 the question of whether a clear fed-
eral directive pre-empts state apportionment of worldwide income
through the unitary-business concept involves more than a search
for specific federal legislation prohibiting such a state taxation
method. 2 6 Tax treaties to which the United States is a party may
also pre-empt state use of a taxation method. However, the Court
found no directive in the tax treaties of the United States. Despite
the fact that various tax treaties require the Federal Government
to use the arm's-length approach in taxing multinationals, that re-
quirement is generally waived in the case of taxation of a nation's
own domestic corporations.127 Since Container Corporation is a
domestic corporation, the federal tax treaties provided no clear di-
rective on the approach to be taken by the states.128 Finally, the
Court noted that none of the United States tax treaties control the
taxing activities of "sub-national governmental units such as
[s]tates,"129 noting also that the Senate had declined to consent to
such a treaty provision extending restrictions against apportion-
ment to the states. 30
121. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 424, 448 (1979).
122. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2955 (1983).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2956.
126. Congress has considered, but has failed to enact, legislation to regulate this
area of state income taxation. Id. During the litigation of Container, a bill
was introduced in Congress to prohibit apportionment of worldwide income.
H.R. 2918, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). A companion bill was later introduced
to the Senate. S. 1225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). Tax Cases Decided in
Supreme Court's Latest Term Are Deemed Most Significant in More Than a
Decade, DAmY TAx REPORT (BNA) No. 162, at K-1 (Aug. 19, 1983).
127. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2956 (1983).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. See also 124 CONG. REc. 18400, 19076 (1978). Given the Court's hesitance
to intrude into "essentially legislative" areas, Container Corp. of America v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2943 (1983), the Court's reluctance to enter
here is not surprising. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 278-80
(1978).
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Without a clear federal directive prohibiting state use of appor-
tionment in the international context, the question left is whether
foreign policy matters properly left to the federal government are
involved. Container Corporation argued that the "asymmetry"131
in international taxation created by the apportionment method's
conflict with the international norm of the arm's-length method
would result in foreign trade retaliation. In support of this claim,
Container Corporation pointed to an amicus curiae brief filed by
the Solicitor General in a related case, 32 which urged restriction of
state apportionment due to the threat of foreign trade retaliation.
The threat of retaliation was allegedly due to the income distortion
and double taxation problems that the tax presents,133 and the po-
tential inhibition of foreign investments by U.S. firms.134
In considering this matter, the Court claimed little competence
in evaluating the possible offensiveness of this tax policy to foreign
nations, or in balancing the risk of retaliation against United
States' sovereign rights in tax policy.135 Nevertheless, the Court
attempted to create a general framework in which to view the is-
sue. The Court quickly dismissed the claim that the tax created an
automatic asymmetry in international taxation.136 Second, the
Court noted that the tax in Container, unlike that in Japan Line,
was levied against a domestic corporation rather than a foreign
corporation.137 However, the repercussions of this dichotomy be-
tween domestic and foreign corporations was not discussed by the
Court.138 Third, the Court claimed that, despite the interests of
131. Brief for Appellant on the Merits at 33. See also Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of
Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 450-53 (1979).
132. The Solicitor General filed an amicus curiae brief in Chicago Bridge & Iron
Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 457 U.S. 1103 (1983). However, no amicus cu-
riae brief was fied by the Solicitor General in Container.
133. See supra Sections 11(B) & I1(A) of text.
134. A cause of the potential inhibition of foreign investment is that U.S. firms
would demand a greater return on foreign investments to compensate for the
increased tax liabilities. This higher hurdle rate would mean that fewer for-
eign investment options would meet the criteria for investment by American
firms. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
135. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2955 (1983).
136. The Court failed to provide any hint as to when it would find automatic asym-
metry. The question, though, appears to be roughly equivalent to the ques-
tion of inevitable double taxation. As long as the tax does not inevitably
result in double taxation, asymmetry does not automatically result.
137. The Court explicitly left open the question of whether it would change its
analysis in a situation involving a domestic corporation owned by foreign in-
terests. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2956
n.32 (1983).
138. The dissent in Container argued that this domestic-foreign dichotomy was
unwarranted and could have serious repercussions concerning foreign in-
vestment by United States firms. Id. at 2959-60 (Powell, J., dissenting). For an
excellent discussion of the possible effects of this dichotomy see WhiteNack,
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foreign nations, Container Corporation was "amenable to be taxed
in California one way or another."' 39 The Court reasoned that the
amount of taxes paid by Container Corporation was as much a
function of the tax rate applied by California as it was a function of
the apportionment method.140 Finally, the Court was confronted
with the Solicitor General's amicus curiae brief filed in Chicago
Bridge & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. 141 in which the Solici-
tor General had opposed states' use of the unitary-business con-
cept and formula apportionment of worldwide income. The Court
declined to speculate as to why the Solictor General had not filed
amicus curiae brief in Container,142 but concluded that the execu-
tive branch's political position may have changed on the issue.143
This possible shift of the political sands, together with the other
factors considered, convinced the Court that the tax did not impli-
cate foreign policy issues properly left to the Federal
Government.144
Given the political repercussions of the tax,145 the Court's deci-
sion to permit the states to tax within broad constitutional limita-
supra note 3, at 779-82. The governments of Canada, Japan, the Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom have protested to the United States regarding the
investment effects of worldwide income apportionment. Administration
Seeks Unitary Method Compromise, 20 TAx NoTEs 1026 (1983); Tax Policy,
DAImy TAx REPORT (BNA) (Sept. 13, 1983); Unitary Tax, supra note 6, at G-4,
Unitary Taxes, DAILY TAx REPORT (BNA) No. 182, at G-6 (Sept. 19, 1983).
139. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2956 (1983).
140. The dissent objected strenously to this rationale, claiming:
Although [the argument that California could impose the same tax
burden under the arm's-length method simply by raising the general
tax rate] may be true in theory, the argument ignores the political
restraints that make such a course infeasible. If [Container's] tax
rate were increased, the State would be forced to raise the rate for all
corporations.
Id. at 2960 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent's position appears to be cor-
rect here. But, the factor-of-the-tax-rate rationale was not the only justifica-
tion used by the Court in rejecting Container Corporation's claims of foreign
trade retaliation and inhibition of foreign investment; the Court's other ra-
tionale (no automatic asymmetry and the foreign-domestic corporation dis-
tinction) sufficiently justify rejection of those claims.
141. See supra note 132.
142. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 2933, 2956 n.33 (1983).
143. Id. However, the dissent claimed that the Court's conclusion clearly ignored
the position of the executive branch:
I recognize that the Government may change its position from time
to time, but I see no reason to ignore its view in one case currently
pending before the Court when considering another case that raises
exactly the same issue. The Solicitor General has not withdrawn his
memorandum, nor has he supplemented with anything taking a con-
trary position.
Id. at 2960 (Powell, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 2957.
145. In addition to the international and corporate concerns, the concept of the
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tions appears sound. Opposition to the tax by various nations 146
and corporate interests' 47 has been met by strong state support for
the tax.148 Congress appears to be divided on the issue.14 9 In re-
sponse to this divisiveness, President Reagan ordered the Justice
Department not to fie an amicus curiae brief in support of a re-
hearing in Container.5 0 And in an attempt to develop recommen-
dations and possibly a compromise,' 5 1 President Reagan called for
the formation of an international task force, to be composed of rep-
resentatives from the states, the Federal Government, multina-
tional firms, and major trading partners of the United States.
5 2
The conclusion to be drawn from this deluge of political concern
and activity is that the Court was correct in its opinion that the
resolution of this matter was beyond its competency and should
not be decided in a judicial forum. Had the Court chosen to bind
itself, on the basis of a Solicitor General's opinion in a prior
case,153 to the conclusion that the tax method infringed on federal
uniformity, the Court would have struck down the tax on constitu-
New Federalism, designed to shift responsibility and power to the states,
comes into play on this issue. See infra note 148.
146. See supra note 138.
147. See, e.g., Current and Quotable, The Unitary Method of Taxation: Two Views,
20 TAx NoTEs 1045 (1983) (a letter to Treasury Secretary Regan from Franklin
A. Cole, Chair of the Board of the Walter E. Heller Corporation, in opposition
to the worldwide application of the unitary-business/formula apportionment
method).
148. See, e.g., Current and Quotable, The Unitary Method of Taxation: Two Views,
20 TAx NoTEs 1045 (1983) (a letter to President Reagan from illinois Governor
James R. Thompson, Chair of the National Governor's Association, in support
of the worldwide applicaton of the unitary-business/formula apportionment
method; Governor Thompson's letter refers to agreement between the na-
tion's governors and President Reagan on the principles of the New
Federalism).
149. See supra note 126. See also Seventeen Senators Defend Unitary Method, 14
TAx NoTEs 221 (1982) (a letter to Treasury Secretary Regan from seventeen
Senators defending the states' use of the unitary-business method).
150. Unitary Tax, DAiLY TAX REPORT (BNA) No. 185, at G-5 (Sept. 22, 1983). With-
out the Solicitor General's amicus curiae brief, Container Corporation had
virtually no hope for rehearing. Unitary Taxes, DAiLY TAx REPORT (BNA)
No. 197, at G-1 (Oct. 11, 1983).
151. Administration Seeks Unitary Method Compromise, 20 TAx NOTES 1026
(1983).
152. Unitary Tax, supra note 6, at G-5.
153. Admittedly, Chicago Bridge & Iron v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., was closely re-
lated to the Container case. However, based on the numerous factors and the
divergent political concerns which are involved with this issue, the Court
would have had good reason to not accept the Solicitor General's opinion as
determinative even if such an opinion had been specifically filed in
Container. Acceptance of the Solicitor General's opinion as determinative
would have circumvented the political process. But see WhiteNack, supra
note 3, at 778-79 (claiming the Supreme Court was the appropriate forum for
this issue).
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tional grounds. Such an action by the Court would have taken the
question from the essentially political (legislative and executive)
forum in which the question clearly belongs. In the absence of ex-
plicit congressional directives, the Court has been reluctant to
fashion specific constitutional limitations to restrain state powers
of taxation; thus, the Court has permitted the political process to
come to an appropriate political resolution.1
54
IV. CONCLUSION
The Container decision encompassed the major issues of state
corporate income taxation through the use of apportionment of
worldwide income: the determination of a unitary-business, the
distortion of income through apportionment, and the foreign com-
merce clause considerations of double taxation and federal uni-
formity. In the determination of a unitary-business, the Court
refused to restrict the states to a "flow of goods" test. The Court
reaffirmed the "flow of value" test and the functional inquiry into
economies of scale and value transfers, indicating, in rather clear
language, that an initial state court determination should not be
reversed as long as that court uses the proper standards and
reaches a decision which is within "the realm of permissible judg-
ment." In the determination of a unitary-business, the states are
left with a full range of constitutional taxing power, subject only to
self-imposed restrictions.
The Court found that Container Corporation's evidence, dem-
onstrating differing international economic conditions and a resul-
tant 14 percent difference between apportionment and separate
accounting figures, did not present a level of income distortion
warranting rejection of the formula apportionment method in the
international context. The Court left open the question of how
great a difference is necessary to invalidate the use of apportion-
ment. However, the Court's emphasis on the 250 percent differ-
ence struck down in Hans Rees' Sons, and its reliance on the lack
of a "gross distortion," appear to indicate that a very large differ-
ence, with supporting analysis and evidence, will be necessary to
invalidate worldwide income apportionment in a given case.
154. Even critics of the Container decision concede that Congressional action
could clearly resolve the issue, and have called for Congrss to act. See, e.g.,
WhiteNack, supra note 3, at 772. Disagreement with the tax policy, however,
should not lead to the conclusion that the Court incorrectly decided the case,
even if Congress chooses to limit or eliminate the states' options in this area.
The issue is clearly one for Congress and the President to resolve as a matter
of policy. Absent the necessary federal pre-emption, the restraints on state
taxation should only be limited by the broad constitutional limitations enun-
ciated by the Court.
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Foreign commerce clause objections were also insufficient to
warrant rejection of the apportionment method. Despite the exist-
ence of actual double taxation, the Court, for a number of reasons,
found the double taxation in Container to have been tolerable.
The Court also failed to find any explicit federal directive prohibit-
ing the states from using the apportionment method in the interna-
tional context. Nor did the Court find that the tax implicated
foreign policy matters which constitutionally must be left to the
Federal Government. Absent an explicit federal directive, the
Container decision permits the states to employ the apportion-
ment method despite the possibility of foreign trade retaliation.
The result of Container is to allow states a very full range of
permissible taxing activity. Absent federal action to restrict the
states, the Court is not inclined to impose many restrictions of a
constitutional nature. Considering the present political divisive-
ness on the limitation of the state taxing power permitted by
Container, and the search for a compromise at the executive and
legislative levels, the Court's decision appears to be a sound one.
The Container decision forces the issue to resolution at the federal
policy level, where a final, more informed, and politically sensitive
resolution may be reached without unnecessary constitutional
restraints.
John C. Vitek '85
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